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THE EFFECTS OF THE SUNBEAM DECISION ON THE REJECTION OF 
TRADEMARK LICENSES IN BANKRUPTCY 
John Ellwood 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code grants broad powers to the bankruptcy trustee in order to preserve 
the assets of the debtor.  The right to reject an executory contract has become the one of the most 
misunderstood and controversial of the trustee’s powers.  This power has proven to be 
particularly troublesome when used to reject intellectual property licenses.  In 1988, Congress 
passed the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act to protect the licensees of 
intellectual property against rejection by a bankrupt licensor.  The IPLBA provides the licensee 
with a choice between (1) treating the license as terminated and filing a claim for monetary 
damages, or (2) retaining the right to use the intellectual property for the remainder of the term of 
the license.  The enactment of the IPBLA was a direct congressional response to a public outcry 
that the bankruptcy procedures at the time placed too heavy a burden on licensees who had 
invested significant sums to capitalize on the licensed intellectual property. 
Prior to the enactment of the IPBLA, the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol held that rejection of 
an intellectual property license would strip the licensee of the right to use the licensed 
intellectual property.1  Fearing that this decision would have disastrous effects on the economy, 
Congress quickly enacted special rules for the treatment of intellectual property.  However, 
Congress omitted trademarks from the statutory definition of intellectual property.  Due to this 
omission, for almost twenty years the bankruptcy courts continued to apply Lubrizol when a 
trademark license was rejected in bankruptcy.  This trend was recently broken by the Seventh 
Circuit when it ruled that a licensee's contractual right to use a Trademark does not automatically 
                                                          
1 Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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end when the licensee is rejected in bankruptcy by a licensor.2  In the Sunbeam decision, the 
Seventh Circuit explicitly acknowledged that it had split with the Lubrizol holding.  In December 
2012, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Sunbeam matter and therefore there currently 
exists a significant, unresolved circuit split on the issue of rejection of trademark licenses in 
bankruptcy. 
This paper focuses on the potential confusion which is likely to result from the circuit 
split regarding the effect of rejection of a trademark license.  Part I of this paper will provide the 
background information necessary to understand the circuit split.  Subsection A begins with a 
general definition of trademarks and an explanation of the importance of trademark licensing as a 
corporate asset.  Subsection B will describe the jurisdiction of bankruptcy law and the 
procedures of rejection of executory contracts.  The subsection explains the benefits to the debtor 
that assumption and rejection of executory agreements may provide.  Part II examines the special 
treatment afforded to intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy.  This section follows the recent 
evolution of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, as intellectual property issues have begun to 
garner more attention in the last twenty years.  Subsection A of this part discusses the Lubrizol 
decision as well as the Congressional response which instituted amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Subsection B notes that, despite the Congressional action, the Lubrizol decision as applied 
to trademarks stood unopposed for over twenty years.  Part III of this paper examines the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision to break with the Lubrizol precedent and the Sunbeam interpretation 
of rejection of executory agreements.   
The focus of the paper will be to examine the potentially disastrous effects of the circuit 
split between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.  In particular, Part IV examines the possibility that 
Congress intended to abrogate the Lubrizol decision when it enacted the Intellectual Property 
                                                          
2 Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Circ. July 9 2012). 
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Licenses in Bankruptcy Act.  This section will also discuss the confusion which bankruptcy 
courts may now face when defining the effects of rejection.  Part IV examines the potential 
consequences of bankruptcy courts adopting the Sunbeam decision, including potential hazards 
involving exclusivity clauses and naked licensing.  Part V examines the options available to 
resolve the circuit split and the potential effects on trademark licensors and licensees.  This 
section will conclude that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to review the 
Sunbeam decision and resolve the current circuit split so that bankruptcy courts are able to 
properly dispense the law.  Finally, this paper conclude that in the absence of Supreme Court 
guidance, Congressional action is necessary to clarify Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code with 
respect to the effect of rejection on trademark licenses. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
The rejection of executory contracts is a complex and nuanced balance of the policy goals 
of the Bankruptcy Code.  As a basis for understanding the process of rejection and the effects of 
the Sunbeam decision, this section will discuss the underlying policies of trademark licensing 
and bankruptcy procedures.     
A. TRADEMARKS AND THE VALUE OF LICENSING  
Trademarks are important and valuable assets of any business.  The United States Patent 
and Trademark Office defined a trademark as “a word, phrase, symbol or design, or a 
combination thereof, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods of one party from 
those of others.” 3   To the public, a trademark serves as an indication of the quality of the goods 
                                                          
3 See Trademarks FAQS, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp (last visited December 19, 2012).  
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or services. 4   Trademarks benefit consumers by allowing them to identify the products or 
services they wish to buy and to avoid products which they believe are of inferior quality.5  For 
businesses, a trademark represents a long term investment of time, money and effort to garner the 
good will of consumers.  In exchange for this investment, a business is rewarded with a 
trademark which embodies the good will that the public associates with its good or service.6  
Due to the unique nature of trademarks, they are intrinsically linked to the goodwill they 
represent.7  A strong trademark is an essential asset to the business because the mark allows the 
business to capitalize on the goodwill that the public associates with its goods and/or services. 
Trademark licensing has grown into a significant source of revenue for businesses in the 
United States.8  In situations where the owner of a trademark is unable to fully capitalize on its 
trademark, the owner may wish to raise capital by transfer their rights.  The owner of a 
trademark may transfer their rights by assignment or by license.9  An assignment is a permanent 
transfer of ownership and all rights in the trademark. 10  In contrast, licensing is a grant of the 
right to use a trademark, where the ownership of the trademark is not transferred.11  Licensing is 
valuable to a business because it provides a revenue stream over a period of time, yet the 
business retains ownership of the trademark.   
                                                          
4 See 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (1974 & SUPP. 2012) (“A trademark is a 
species of property that denotes a particular standard of quality embodied in the product or service, symbolizes the 
good will of its owner, and represents an advertising investment.”) 
5 See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The consumer who knows at a glance whose 
brand he is being asked to buy knows whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and whose product to buy 
in the future if the brand pleases."). 
6 GILSON supra note 4, § 1.03 [4] (“If the mental associations evoked by the trademark are favorable, the 
trademark has come to symbolize the good will of its owner by encouraging repeated purchases by the consumer”). 
7 Id. (“In fact, a trademark cannot exist apart from the going business in which it is used. The trademark and 
the good will it represents can thus be said to be inseparable”). 
8 Id. at § 6.01 (“In the United States, trademark licensing has become a huge business, fueled by the 
franchising boom of the 1960s and 1970s and early court decisions enforcing the licensing of sports teams logos”). 
9 See Id. at § 3.06[2]. 
10 See Id. (“A valid assignment…transfers ownership of the mark to the assignee, who thereafter may assert 
exclusive rights of his own”). 
11 See Id. (“A trademark assignment, which transfers title in the mark, must be distinguished from a 
trademark license, which does not”).   
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B. THE TREATMENT OF LICENSES IN BANKRUPTCY 
In the United States, jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters is expressly reserved to the 
federal government by the Constitution.12  The majority of bankruptcy law is codified under Title 
11 of the United States Code, which is referred to as the Bankruptcy Code. 13   There are 
numerous types of bankruptcy14, however this paper focuses on liquidation and reorganization, 
the two basic types of bankruptcy available to business entities.  Liquidation bankruptcy, 
contained in Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,15 collects the debtor’s assets, sells them at 
auction, and then divides the proceeds between the creditors. 16  Reorganization bankruptcy, 
contained in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 17  allows the debtor 18  to file a plan of 
reorganization19 to elect to keep certain assets and pay the creditors over a period of time.  The 
plan of reorganization must be approved by the creditors20 and confirmed by the court.21  The 
                                                          
12 Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the sole power to enact 
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States". 
13 The general procedures for bankruptcy are contained in Title 11 of the United States Code.  11 U.S.C. § 
101 et seq. (2006).  The jurisdiction and procedures of the Bankruptcy Courts are contained under Title 28 of the 
United States Code.  28 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2006).  Bankruptcy related crimes are enumerated under Title 18 of the 
United States Code.  18 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2006). 
14 Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code provides relief to municipalities.  11 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006).  
Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy code provides relief to farmers and fishermen.  11 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (2006).  
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code allows for individuals to reorganize their debts.  11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (2006).  
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides procedures for multinational bankruptcies.  11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. 
(2006).  Chapters 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code are discussed in greater detail later in this paragraph. See infra p. 
4-5.   
15 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2006). 
16 In bankruptcy, claims are paid in order of priority with “secured” claims treated as the highest priority,  
“administrative” claims second highest priority, and “unsecured” claims as the lowest priority, paid on a pro rata 
basis only if there are any funds remaining.  11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) 
17 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (2006). 
18 The debtor is granted an exclusive period of 120 days to file a plan of reorganization, after which his 
creditors may propose competing plans of reorganization.  11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2006). 
19  11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2006) (The plan of reorganization must be approved by the creditors).   
20  11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2006) 
21  The plan of reorganization must be confirmed by the bankruptcy court.  11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006). 
6 
main goal of bankruptcy is provide relief to individuals and businesses who cannot repay their 
creditors.22  To this end, it is imperative for the court to preserve the assets of the debtor. 
When a business entity files for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
entity is usually allowed to continue to operate the business as a "debtor-in-possession"23, under 
supervision of the court.24  During the process of a bankruptcy reorganization, the trustee or 
debtor-in-possession has the right, subject to approval by the bankruptcy court, to assume or 
reject any executory contract to which it is a party.25  The term “executory contract” is not 
defined in the Bankruptcy Code, however the many Circuits26 have adopted the “Countryman” 
definition that a contract is executory if it is "a contract under which the obligation of both the 
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to 
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the 
other."27  As an oversimplification, an agreement is no longer executory once one of the parties 
has substantially fulfilled their contractual obligations.   
In the event a Debtor decides to assume the contract, both parties must resume 
performance of the agreement as though the bankruptcy had never occurred.28  The executory 
                                                          
22  The bankrupt individual or business is referred to as the “debtor” in bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C. § 
101(13)(2006). 
23 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2006). 
24 7-1101 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 1101.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) 
(“Upon the commencement of a chapter 11 case, the debtor automatically becomes a debtor in possession”). 
25 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). 
26 See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989)(applying the 
Countryman definition when determining that a natural gas contract quailed as an executory contract for purposes of 
rejection in bankruptcy);  Phoenix Exploration, Inc. v. Yaquinto (In re Murexco Petroleum, Inc.), 15 F.3d 60, 62-63 
n.8 (5th Cir. 1994)(adopting the Countryman definition when it determined that a contract for operating rights of oil 
and gas reserves did not qualify as executory because the debtor had substantially performed its obligations); Zurich 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Int'l Fibercom, Inc. (In re Int'l Fibercom, Inc.), 503 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2007)(adopting the 
Countryman definition when determining that a workers compensation insurance policy was not executory); Cf. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)(The Supreme Court has not expressly 
adopted the Countryman definition, however it has held that a labor contract was executory because there were 
“reciprocal obligations” and “performance was due by both parties”). 
27 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). 
28 See Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp), 281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 2002)(“ If the trustee or debtor-in-possession assumes a contract, it is not interrupted and the contracting parties' 
7 
contract must be assumed in full, the debtor may not assume a contract in part.29  The debtor 
must affirmatively assume each executory agreement. 30   Failure to affirmatively assume an 
agreement resumes in automatic rejection of that agreement.31  In order to assume an agreement 
the debtor must first cure any default and provide adequate assurance of future performance.32  
Once the debtor cures any defaults and provides adequate assurance of future performance, the 
non-bankrupt party is obligated to resume performance.  Presumably the non-bankrupt party 
would become liable for breach of contract if it refused to resume performance of the agreement.   
As an alternative the Debtor may reject the agreement, which releases the debtor from 
any future obligation under the contract.33  The rejection is considered to be a material breach of 
the agreement as of the date of the filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.34  It is important to 
recognize that the Debtor is in complete control of this decision.  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
declared that the “the authority to reject an executory contract is vital to the basic purpose to a 
Chapter 11 reorganization, because rejection can release the debtor's estate from burdensome 
obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.”35  When reviewing a debtor's rejection 
of an executory contract under section 365(a), the reviewing court must apply the business 
judgment standard.36  In bankruptcy, the business judgment standard simply asks whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rights are undisturbed.”)(citing Lawrence P. King et al., Collier on Bankruptcy P365.01 pp. 365-17 (15th ed. Rev. 
2002)). 
29 Id. 
30 In Chapter 7 bankruptcies the executory agreement must be affirmatively assumed within 60 days of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition.  11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (2006).  In Chapter 11 bankruptcies the executory 
agreement must be assumed before confirmation of the plan by the bankruptcy judge.  11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (2006). 
31 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (2006). 
32 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (2006). 
33 See Sunbeam at 377 (citing Bildisco at 531). 
34 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(2006). 
35 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528 (1984). 
36 See Group of Inst. Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550 
(1943)(applying the business judgment rule to the rejection of executory agreements in bankruptcy). 
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rejection benefits the estate. 37   Once the license is rejected the non-bankrupt party has no 
recourse to compel performance of the agreement.  In the event of a rejection of the agreement, 
the non-bankrupt party is entitled to an unsecured claim for monetary damages based on the 
breach of the agreement.38   
II. THE REJECTION OF INTELLECTION PROPERTY LICENSES IN BANKRUPTCY  
Congress has granted special protection to licensees whose intellectual property license is 
rejected in bankruptcy.  Pursuant to Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, in the narrow 
circumstance where the bankrupt entity is the licensor of intellectual property who rejects an 
agreement under Section 365(a), the non-bankrupt licensee is provided with two options.  The 
first option is for the licensee to treat the rejection as a termination of the entire agreement.39  
Both parties are released from further obligation under the license and the licensee may pursue a 
claim in bankruptcy for monetary damages attributable to the rejection of the license.40  The 
second option available to the licensee is to retain its right to use the licensed intellectual 
property for the remaining term of the rejected agreement.  This second choice is a dramatic 
departure from the unilateral process of rejection in bankruptcy. 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 365(N) 
The addition of Section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code was a direct Congressional 
response to Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.41  In 1982, Richmond 
Metal Finishers, Inc. ("RMF") granted to Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. ("Lubrizol") a nonexclusive 
                                                          
37 N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 79 (3d Cir.1982)(the “usual test for rejection of an 
executory contract is simply whether rejection would benefit the estate, the ‘business judgment’ test”), affirmed 465 
U.S. 513, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (1984). 
38 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006); See also Sunbeam at 377. 
39 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A) (2006). 
40 Essentially this option allows the licensee to “opt-in” to the default treatment under 11 U.S.C. 365(g) 
41 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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license to use RMF's patented metal coating process technology. 42   RMF later filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 reorganization and elected to reject the Lubrizol license pursuant to 
365(a).43  Before approving the rejection, the bankruptcy court applied the "two-step inquiry to 
determine the propriety of rejection: first, whether the contract is executory; next, if so, whether 
its rejection would be advantageous to the bankrupt." 44  Upon finding that the license was 
executory, due to the continuing contractual obligations of both parties, and that rejection was in 
the interest of RMF, the bankruptcy court approved RMF’s rejection of the Lubrizol license.45  
Lubrizol immediately appealed to the District Court.  The District Court reversed, finding that 
the license was not executory and therefore RMF’s rejection of the Lubrizol license was 
improper.46 
On appeal the Fourth Circuit reinstated the Bankruptcy Court decision to approve the 
rejection of the Lubrizol contract.  The court found that the bankruptcy court had properly 
determined the agreement was executory and ripe for rejection.  In its opinion the Fourth Circuit 
recognized that, from a policy perspective, the rejection of intellectual property licenses 
"imposes serious burdens upon contracting parties".47  However, the court determined that it 
would be improper to grant special treatment to intellectual property licenses which had not been 
given by Congress.  It noted that, at that time, special treatment was only afforded to lessees of 
real property48 and collective bargaining agreements49, and that only Congress could granted 
special treatment to intellectual property licenses.   
                                                          
42 Id. at 1045. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 1048. 
48 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2006). 
49 See NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (U.S. 1984)("…the Bankruptcy Court should permit rejection 
of a collective-bargaining agreement under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor can show that the 
10 
The Lubrizol decision produced “a strong adverse reaction within the intellectual 
property, high technology, and investor communities”. 50   In response to the public outcry, 
Senators Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) and Howell Heflin (D-AL) introduced the “Intellectual 
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1987” for consideration by the Senate on August 7, 1987.  
The bill was enacted on October 18, 1988 as the “Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy 
Act of 1988” (“IPLBA”). 51  In the official record, Senator DeConcini noted that the Lubrizol 
decision had disastrous effects on the economy as “potential licensees are now insisting on total 
ownership transfers to prevent the possible loss of rights during a bankruptcy filing.”52  With the 
passage of the IPLBA, Congress intended "to make clear that the rights of an intellectual 
property licensee to use the licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the 
rejection of the license." 53   The IPBLA amended the Bankruptcy Code created a special 
exception for the rejection of intellectual property licenses54 and introduced a statutory definition 
of “intellectual property”55.     
The newly added Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “intellectual 
property” as a trade secret, patent, patent application, plant variety, copyright, and/or mask 
work. 56   Noticeable absent are trademarks, trade names and service marks.  According to 
contemporaneous Congressional statements, trademarks were omitted “to postpone 
congressional action in this area and to allow the development of equitable treatment of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
collective-bargaining agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of 
rejecting the labor contract.”)  
50  4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19[A][06]  
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011) (1963). 
51 Pub. L. No. 100-06, 102 Stat. 2358 (1988). 
52 134 Cong. Rec. S12993-01, Congressional Record - Senate, 1988 WL 182382 (September 20, 1988). 
53 S. Rep. No. 100-505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.   
54 Later codified as 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2006). 
55 Later codified as 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)(2006). 
56 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)(2006). 
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situation by bankruptcy courts.57  The courts disagree whether the omission was an implicit 
approval of the Lubrizol decision as applied to trademark.58  Despite the disagreement over the 
intent of Congress when it enacted the IPBLA, courts have consistently held that Section 365(n) 
does not apply to trademarks.59 
B. THE VALIDITY OF THE LUBRIZOL DECISION IN THE WAKE OF THE IPLBA 
The year following the enactment of the IPBLA, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Rhode Island held that a trademark licensee whose license is rejected may only pursue to a claim 
of monetary damages for breach of contract.60  In July 1989, Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc. 
entered into a licensing agreement with Mr. Popper, Inc. for the use of the Blackstone trademark 
and trade name.  Two months later Blackstone Potato Chip Co. filed for bankruptcy protection 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and rejected the Mr. Popper license pursuant to 365(a).  
The rejection was upheld by the bankruptcy court on the grounds that it satisfied the business 
judgment rule.  The court ordered the trademark and trade name to be transferred from the 
licensee to the debtor and held that the licensee was only entitled to an “unsecured claim for 
breach of its executory contract”. 61  Curiously the bankruptcy court did not discuss Section 
365(n) despite being decided a full year after enactment, however it is clear that the holding is in 
line with other courts which have held that 365(n) does not extend to trademark.  Although the 
court did not explicitly acknowledge Lubrizol, the court came to the same conclusion. 
In a 2002 adversarial proceeding, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 
District of California also followed the Lubrizol holding after determined that trademark 
                                                          
57 S. Rep. No. 505, S. REP. 100-505, 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204. 
58 Compare Centura, 281 B.R.at  660(stating that it is improper to consider legislative history because the 
Bankruptcy Code definition of intellectual property clearly omits trademark); with Sunbeam at 375 (stating that “an 
omission is just an omission” and that an omission is not a signal of congressional intent). 
59  Infra p.11-16. 
 60 In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc., 109 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990). 
61  Id at 559. 
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licensees are not entitled to relief under Section 365(n) due to the fact that the Bankruptcy Code 
definition of “intellectual property” plainly excludes trademarks.62  The history of the licensing 
arrangement between the parties is convoluted, therefore for our purposes it will suffice that 
Raima UK was the sub-licensor of the “Raima” trademark and Centura UK, a subsidiary of 
Centura US, was the sub-licensee of that trademark.63   Soon after filing a petition for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection in the United States, Centura US rejected the trademark license between 
its subsidiary and Raima UK and the rejection was approved by the bankruptcy court.  Raima 
UK filed adversarial proceedings seeking a declaration that it retained its right to use the 
trademarks pursuant to 365(n).  Upon surveying the issue post-enactment of IPLBA, the 
bankruptcy court declared that “both pre and post-amendment cases as well as scholarly writings 
suggest that, upon the rejection of a trademark license, Lubrizol's harsh holding controls, and the 
licensee is left with only a claim for breach.”64  Raima UK was stripped of the trademark and 
Lubrizol remained the law of the land as applied to trademark. 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware came to the same conclusion in the 
2003 bankruptcy of office space franchisor HQ Global Holdings, Inc. (“HQ Global”).65  HQ 
Global, and its related entities, entered into franchise agreements with numerous parties for the 
use of HQ Global’s “trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, emblems, insignia, and other 
indicia of origin”.66   After filing for Chapter 11 reorganization, HQ Global moved to reject the 
franchise agreements.  The franchisees argued that they retained the right to use the trademarks 
pursuant to 365(g) because a breach of the agreement would not automatically terminate the right 
                                                          
62 In re Centura, 281 B.R. at 660. 
63 Id. at 663. (Raima Corporation, as the original owner of the trademarks, granted the exclusive right to use 
the trademarks in the UK market to its subsidiary Raima UK.  Raima UK was then sold to a third party but the 
license survived.  Raima Corporation was thereafter purchased by Centura US.  The UK subsidiary of Centura US, 
Centura UK, sublicensed the trademark rights back from Raima UK.). 
64 Id. at 673. 
65 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
66 Id. at 509. 
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to use the trademark.  The bankruptcy court was not persuaded.  It held that “that affirmative 
obligation of the Debtors to allow the Franchisees to use the marks is excused” by rejection.67 
Further, the “Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks in its protected class of intellectual 
property, Lubrizol controls and the Franchisees' right to use the trademarks stops on rejection.”68   
Lubrizol was first challenged in a Third Circuit concurrence in 2010.69  In 1991, Enersys, 
Inc. (“Enersys”) purchased the majority of Exide Technologies’ (“Exide”) industrial battery 
business.  Contemporaneous with the purchase, the parties entered into a “Trademark and Trade 
Name License Agreement” wherein Enersys was granted a “perpetual, exclusive, royalty-free 
license to use the Exide trademark in the industrial battery business”, while Exide retained use of 
the mark in connection with other goods and services. 70  Exide filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection and attempted to reject the license pursuant to 365(a). 71   The bankruptcy court 
determined that the contract was executory and therefore approved the rejection. The bankruptcy 
court further held that the licensee had no right to continued use of the mark following rejection, 
expressly stating that trademark licenses are not included in Section 365(n). The district court 
affirmed.  In a non-controversial majority opinion, the Third Circuit reversed the lower courts, 
holding the license was not executory because Exide had substantial performed its contractual 
obligations.  The majority did not reach the effect of rejection on a trademark license because the 
license could not be rejected under Section 365(a).  The Exide majority did not hint whether it 
would have applied Lubrizol had it determined that the contract was executory. 
Although the Exide majority did not discuss whether Lubrizol would have applied if the 
contract was deemed executory, Judge Ambro issued a concurrence in which he attacked the 
                                                          
67 Id. at 513. 
68 Id. (citing In re Centura, 281 B.R. at 673, n. 24). 
69 Exide, 607 F.3d at 957. 
70 Id. at 961. 
71 Id. at 960. 
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Lubrizol interpretation of rejection.  He argued that pursuant to the plain language of 365(g), 
rejection is simply a breach of the agreement and does not terminate the agreement. 72  The 
concurrence argued that this distinction is significant because outside of bankruptcy a breach of 
the agreement would not automatically terminate the licensee’s contractual right to continued 
using trademark.73  Further, Judge Ambro insisted that the omission of trademark from coverage 
under 365(n) did not prove Congressional intent to codify the Lubrizol decision.74  He concluded 
that “the Courts here should have used… their equitable powers to give Exide a fresh start 
without stripping EnerSys of its fairly procured trademark rights.”75  Despite Judge Ambro’s 
spirited concurrence, none of the other members of the panel joined his concurrence and Lubrizol 
remained good law in the Third Circuit. 
 
III. THE RECENT SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN SUNBEAM PRODUCTS, INC. V. 
CHICAGO AMERICAN MANUFACTURING, LLC 
The Lubrizol decision was expressly repudiated by the Seventh Circuit when it ruled that 
a licensee's contractual right to use a Trademark does not automatically end when the licensee is 
rejected in bankruptcy.76  In 2008, Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co. (“Lakewood”) 
entered into a supply agreement with Chicago American Manufacturing (“CAM”) which granted 
to CAM the right to use certain patents and trademarks in order to produce box fans which would 
be sold to Lakewood within 30 days of production.  Shortly thereafter a group of creditors filed 
an involuntary liquidation bankruptcy action against Lakewood.  A bankruptcy trustee was 
appointed to liquidate the company by auctioning off the Lakewood assets.  At auction the 
                                                          
72 Id. at 967(Ambro, J., concurring). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Sunbeam 686 F.3d at 372. 
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Lakewood patent and trademark portfolios were sold to Sunbeam Products (“Sunbeam”) 77 .  
Sunbeam Products desired to produce its own Lakewood brand box fans, therefore the trustee did 
not assign the CAM license as part of the sale of assets. 78   Soon after the sale of the Lakewood 
assets, the bankruptcy trustee to reject Lakewood‘s supply agreement with CAM.79  During the 
auction process CAM continued to make Lakewood brand box fans for the 2009 season and sold 
most at a steep discount to clear inventory after Lakewood declined purchasing them. 80  
Sunbeam filed an adversarial action in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
arguing that CAM had violated the Lakewood patents and trademarks by producing box fans 
which were not covered by the rejected supply agreement.81 
The bankruptcy court examined the supply agreement and found that its terms were 
ambiguous as to the amount of fans to be produced.82  To resolve the ambiguity, the court relied 
on extrinsic evidence to determine that the fans at issue were covered by the supply agreement.83  
The court found that, although trademarks are not covered by 365(n), the rejection of the supply 
agreement did not end CAM’s right to continue making Lakewood box fans using the Lakewood 
trademark.84  The court then took up Judge Ambro's challenge to “begin the ‘development of 
equitable treatment’ Congress anticipated would occur.”85  The court thereupon decide in favor 
of CAM and allowed the use of the Lakewood trademark on equitable grounds.  
                                                          
77 During the purchase of the Lakewood assets, Sunbeam Products, Inc. was doing business as Jarden 
Consumer Solutions.  See Id. at 374. 
78 The debtor may assign any executory contracts, regardless of whether the terms of the license allows for 
assignment.  11 U.S.C. § 365(f). 
79 Sunbeam 686 F.3d at 374 
80 Szilagyi v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC (In re Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co.), 459 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2011). 
81 Id. at 322-24.  
82 Id. at 345. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. (finding that the Lakewood patents were not infringed because 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) extends to patents 
and therefore CAM had properly exercised its right to retain the patent rights pursuant to the terms of the license. 
85 Id. at 345 (quoting S. Rep. No. 505). 
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On appeal the Seventh Circuit vigorously disagreed with equitable approach of the 
bankruptcy court, and by extension Judge Ambro.86  The Circuit court noted that an equitable 
approach would lead to uneven application of the law by the bankruptcy courts because of the 
ambiguous nature of equitable treatment.87  Yet in the end the appeals court upheld the decision 
on the bankruptcy court on different grounds than the lower court.  Focusing on the statutory 
language of section 365(g), which states, in part, that “rejection of an executory contract…of the 
debtor constitutes a breach of such contract”,88 the Sunbeam court expressly rejected the Lubrizol 
decision, noting that “[o]utside of bankruptcy, a licensor's breach does not terminate a licensee's 
right to use intellectual property.”89  In its holding, the Seventh Circuit expressly recognized that 
its decision would create “a conflict among the circuits”, 90  yet no judge within the circuit 
favored rehearing the case en banc.91  A petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed by Sunbeam 
Products and the Supreme Court denied Certiorari on December 10, 2012.92 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE EFFECTS OF REJECTION OF A TRADEMARK LICENSE 
BY A BANKRUPT LICENSOR 
In the aftermath of the Sunbeam decision there now exists a significant disagreement 
between the circuits regarding the effect of rejection on a trademark license.  The Lubrizol and 
Sunbeam courts hold opposite positions on whether the licensee retains its right to use the 
licensed trademark after rejection of the license.  Lubrizol and its progeny teach that the licensee 
loses its right to use the trademark and may only file a claim for monetary damages attributable 
                                                          
86 Sunbeam 686 F.3d at 376. 
87 See Id. at 375, 376 (“There are hundreds of bankruptcy judges, who have many different ideas about 
what is equitable in any given situation.  Some may think that equity favors licensee’s reliance interests; others may 
believe that equity favors the creditors, who can realize more of their claims if the debtor can terminate IP licenses.  
Rights depend, however, on what the Code provides rather than on notions of equity.”). 
88 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1)(2006). 
89 Sunbeam 686 F.3d at 376. 
90 Id at 378. 
91 Id.  
92 Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9472 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2012). 
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to the rejection.  Sunbeam instructs that the licensee’s right to use the intellectual property 
remains unaffected by rejection.  These holdings cannot be reconciled, therefore this section will 
examine the impact of the Sunbeam decision on bankruptcy courts facing this issue. 
Prior to the Sunbeam decision, at least one bankruptcy courts had inferred that, by its 
silence, Congress codified Lubrizol as it has been applied to trademark licenses.93   This court 
saw the omission of trademark from the Bankruptcy Code definition of intellectual property as a 
significant congressional act because Congress was well aware of the impact of Lubrizol on all 
forms of intellectual property.94  The Sunbeam court disagreed, stating that an “omission is just 
an omission.” 95   As the Sunbeam court noted, the Senate committee report explained that 
trademarks were omitted “to allow the development of equitable treatment of this situation by 
bankruptcy court.”96  The ambiguity of the congressional record could be construed to support 
either viewpoint. 
Although Congress may not have explicitly codified Lubrizol, nor has it acted to limit its 
application to trademark licenses.  In fact, the Supreme Court has previously declared that it 
would “not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication 
that Congress intended such a departure.”97  Prior to the Sunbeam opinion, bankruptcy courts 
across the nation have followed Lubrizol by treating rejection of the agreement as a termination 
of the rights of the licensee to use the intellectual property.98  It is clear that it was the practice of 
bankruptcy courts to apply Lubrizol when analyzing the rejection of trademark licenses in 
                                                          
93 See In re Centura at 673. 
94 Id. at  
95 Sunbeam 686 F.3d at 375. 
96 S. Rep. 100-505 (1988). 
97 Pennsylvania Pub. Welfare Dep’t v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990). 
98 See In re Centura; In re HQ Global.  
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bankruptcy.  Despite a lack of specific intent by Congress to change the status quo, the Sunbeam 
court has broken with two decades of bankruptcy practice.   
Complicating matters is that fact that the Sunbeam interpretation of Section 365(g) may 
render Section 365(n) to be superfluous.  It is a well settled principle of statutory construction 
that a court should interpret a statute “as to avoid rendering superfluous” any part of the 
stature.99   The Bankruptcy Code specifically uses the term “breach” in 365(g) and “terminated” 
in 365(n).  As the Sunbeam court correctly noted, outside of bankruptcy the non-breaching party 
has the option to cancel the agreement upon a material “breach”,100 thus releasing both parties 
from further contractual obligations, or to waive the breach and continue to perform the 
agreement.  The result of the Sunbeam decision is that Trademark licensees receive the same 
treatment under 365(g) that statutory “intellectual property” licensees receive under 365(n).   
Even outside of the intellectual property context, courts have struggled to construe the 
effects of rejection under Section 365(g).  As the Fourth Circuit has aptly noted, the “effect of 
rejection is one of the great mysteries of bankruptcy law.”101  In particular, the difficulties arise 
when courts try to determine which contractual provisions are subject to rejection.  The Lubrizol 
interpretation neatly avoids this difficultly by terminating all obligations and benefits.  The 
Sunbeam decision does not touch on this issue, however past bankruptcy cases may provide 
guidance.  This section will examine the various contractual provisions which have plagued 
courts. 
                                                          
99 See Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991); See also Montclair v. 
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)( declaring that courts should “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 
of  a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning 
of the language it employed”). 
100 UCC 2-106(4) (2010)("Cancellation occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by 
the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that the cancelling party also retains any remedy 
for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance.”) 
101 Cromwell Field Assoc. F. App’x. 186, 188 (4th Circ. 2001). 
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Courts have been extremely inconsistent when dealing with the rejection of individual 
contractual provisions.  Courts have come to opposite outcomes when deciding whether a debtor 
may reject a covenant not to compete.  The Bankruptcy Court for Massachusetts has previously 
held that a covenant not to compete was invalid upon rejection of the contract and the non-
bankrupt party was limited to a claim for damages.102  However, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Florida came to the opposite conclusion, finding that a covenant not to 
compete remains valid despite rejection of a contract.103  Courts have also come to opposite 
conclusions on whether the right of first refusal may be rejected.104  Adding to the confusion, the 
Ninth Circuit has previously held that a debtor may specifically reject the exclusivity provision 
of a contract. 105  The Select-A-Seat was partially abrogated by Section 365(n)(1)(B),106 it is 
entirely possible that it would still be valid as applied to trademark, as trademark is not covered 
by 365(n).  The courts are in complete disarray when handling the rejection of contractual 
obligation. 
The Sunbeam interpretation of rejection may also cause havoc with the quality control 
provisions of rejected licenses.  There is evidence to suggest that Congress may have been wary 
of this unique problem when it decided omitted trademark from the IPBLA. 107  Trademark 
licensing is unique in that the trademark licensor is required to maintain quality control when 
licensing a trademark.  A lack of quality control over the licensed use of a trademark is referred 
                                                          
102 See Maids Int'l v. Ward (In re Ward), 194 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). 
103 See In re Printronics, Inc., 189 B.R. 995, 1000 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995)(‘rejection of the franchise 
agreement does not terminate the covenant not to compete”). 
104 Compare In re Bergt, 241 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1999) (holding that the right of first refusal is not 
subject to rejection), with In re Kellstrom Industries, Inc., 286 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that the right 
of first refusal is executory in nature and therefore subject to rejection by the debtor). 
105 See In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2nd 290, 293 (9th Circuit 1980)(“rejection can cancel covenants 
requiring future performance by the debtor.”). 
106 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B)(2006)(a licensee may retain its “right to enforce any exclusivity provision.”). 
107 S. Rep. 100-505 (1988)(“In particular, trademark, trade name and service mark licensing relationships 
depend to a large extent on control of the quality of the products or services sold by the licensee” ).  
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to as “naked licensing”. While it is not required that the license itself contains a provision for 
quality control,108 the licensor must make actual efforts to enforce quality control standards over 
the course of the license.109  The trademark licensor may not passively rely on the licensee to 
maintain quality.110  The trademark owner-licensor must maintain “reasonable control over the 
nature and quality of the goods, services, or business on which the [mark] is used by the 
licensee.” 111   Failure to enforce quality controls may result in the abandonment and 
unenforceability of the trademark.112  Once abandoned, the trademark essentially lose all value as 
anyone may use the mark on their own product.113   
Under the Sunbeam interpretation of 365(g) it is unclear how quality control provisions 
would apply post rejection.   Contractual quality controls are a mutual benefit and a mutual 
obligation.  Both parties are benefited by the continued strength and viability of the trademark.  
The licensor is obligated to enforce the quality controls and the licensee is obligated to conform 
to the contractual specifications.  However, bankruptcy courts have held that specific 
performance is not an available post-rejection remedy. 114  As the bankruptcy court would be 
unable to enforce the quality control provision, rejection very well might render the quality 
control provision unenforceable.  The entire quality control mechanism would be messy post-
                                                          
108 See FreecycleSunnyvale v. The FreeCycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 516 (9th Cir. Nov. 24, 2010). 
109 Id. 
110 See Barcamerica Int'l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002)(Licensor of the 
“Leonardo DaVinci” trademark for wine was found to have abandoned the mark because minimal efforts were made 
to enforce quality of the licensee’s wine, including infrequent tasting of the wine). 
111 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 33 (1995). 
112 See American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1963); Eva’s Bridal Ltd. 
v. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., 639 F.3d 788 (7th Circ. 2011); Barcamerica Int'l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 
F.3d 589 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002); FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010). 
113 It is important to note that abandonment extends only to the specific trademark as used in connection 
with specific goods or services by the owner of the abandoned trademark.  For example, if the Coca Cola Company 
abandoned the “Coke” mark, competitors would be free to use the “Coke” trademark on goods and services covered 
by the trademarks owned by the Coca Cola Company, such as Class 32 soft drinks.  It would not, however, allow use 
of the “Coke” mark on goods and services where a third party maintains a valid trademark. 
114 See Midway Motor Lodge of Elk Grove v. Innkeepers ’ Telemanagement & Equipment Corp. , 54 F.3d 
406, 407 (7th Cir. 1995)("Rejection avoids specific performance, but the debtor assumes a financial obligation 
equivalent to damages for breach of contract"). 
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rejection.  The worst case scenario would be a licensor who is unable to enforce any quality 
controls thereby abandoning the mark and completely destroying the value of the trademark.   
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
There are two solutions to the current crisis, a Supreme Court decision resolving the 
circuit split or Congressional action to resolve the ambiguity of the statute.  This section will 
address each option in turn. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT MUST RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The most pressing issue is to quiet the conflict between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.  
Uniformity in the application of the Bankruptcy Code is of paramount concern.  It is clear that 
the Lubrizol and Sunbeam decisions cannot be reconciled therefore it is imperative that the 
Supreme Court step in to settle this dispute.  The current state of the law is that two identical 
bankrupt-licensors will receive completely opposite treatment in the Fourth and Seventh circuits.  
The licensor will receive more favorable treatment in the Fourth Circuit and less favorable 
treatment in the Seventh.  This uncertainty is detrimental to the uniform application of the 
Bankruptcy Code and may encourage forum shopping.  Much more troubling is that this 
uncertainty may have a chilling effect on the negotiation of trademark licenses. 
The circuit split will arguably make it harder for parties to come to terms on a trademark 
license agreement when the licensor is financially distressed. The licensee may be unwilling to 
risk losing the right to use the trademark if the licensor files for bankruptcy.  As Congress has 
noted, “licensees sometimes use the licensed technology as the basis for an entire business.”115  
The licensor may also be hesitant to license its trademark with the threat of bankruptcy looming.  
While licensing would provide a stream of revenue to stave off bankruptcy, the licensor may 
determine that it is too risky to license.  This may lead to a less productive use of otherwise 
                                                          
115 H.Rep. 100-506 (1988) 
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viable trademarks.  The uncertainty will make it much harder for the licensor and licensee to 
reach agreement on a licensing agreement.  The uncertainty may also has disastrous effects on 
the liquidation sale of trademarks in bankruptcy. Until the issuance of the Sunbeam opinion, the 
purchaser of a trademark was guarantee to receive a trademark free and clear of encumbrances.  
Bidders may be reluctant to pay “full price” for a trademark which they may have to share with a 
prior licensee.  The current uncertainty will increase the amount of diligence the bidder must 
undertake before placing a bid and may dissuade potential buyers. 
As a general matter, supporters of the Sunbeam interpretation would argue that the non-
bankrupt licensee should be favored because it is a good actor and therefore it should not be 
punished for the debtor’s business failing.  The licensee has presumptively satisfied their 
obligations under the license and it is through no fault of the licensee that the licensor has gone 
bankrupt.  The Lubrizol interpretation to deny continued use of the Trademark would have 
disastrous effects on the licensee.  The Licensee itself may be forced into bankruptcy if it is 
denied use of the trademark.  The licensee may have invested considerable time, effort and 
money into build a business which relies on the use of the Trademark.  Under Sunbeam the 
licensee is also still obligated to make the contractual royalty payments to the debtor, which in 
turn would be distributed to the other creditors.  Supporters of the Sunbeam interpretation would 
argue it should be affirmed because allowing the licensee to continue use of the trademark 
provides the greatest value to the creditors.   
Detractors of the Sunbeam decision would argue that the Lubrizol interpretation of 
rejection should be adopted because it strengthens the Bankruptcy estate and provides more 
value to the creditors.  Bankruptcy allows a narrow opportunity to financially rehabilitate the 
debtor into a productive member of the corporate society.  The debtors is already in a precarious 
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financial position and the trademark may be one of the few assets with any value. The 
bankruptcy estates as a whole would be hurt by the Sunbeam interpretation of rejection because 
it would encumber the trademark with agreements which existed before Bankruptcy.  This 
interpretation would possibly provide less value to the remaining creditors as bidders would not 
pay as much at auction for the encumbered trademark as they might for the unencumbered 
trademark.  However, it should be noted that the Sunbeam interpretation might offset this risk 
through ongoing royalty payments by the licensee. In sum, supporters of the Lubrizol 
interpretation would argue that the licensor must be allowed to reject the trademark license in its 
entirety so that it is able to maximize the value of the mark.  One thing is absolutely certain, 
continued uncertainty regarding the effect of rejection would be disastrous to all of the involved 
parties.  Unfortunately, now that the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the Sunbeam matter, 
the circuit split may not be resolved for quite some time.   
B. CONGRESS MUST CLARIFY THE EFFECT OF REJECTION 
Although the Supreme Court must now wait for another opportunity to resolve the circuit 
split, Congress is free to clarify the effect of rejection at any time and should act immediately.  
At this time, the circuit courts are in disarray and many bankruptcy courts have issued conflicting 
opinions regarding rejection. 116   Congress needs to step in and provide guidance to the 
bankruptcy courts so that rejection is handled uniformly.  As one option, Congress could amend 
the bankruptcy code to expressly state that the right to use a trademark does not survive rejection 
of a trademark license in bankruptcy.  As an alternative, Congress could act to include trademark 
in the bankruptcy code definition of intellectual property and thereby extend coverage of Section 
265(n) to trademarks.   
                                                          
116 See supra p. 18-19. 
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Trademarks are traditionally considered to be intellectual property, therefore there is a 
certain logical to including trademarks in the bankruptcy code definition of intellectual property.   
Yet trademarks are unique in that indicate a single source of origin of a good or service and 
therefore may be used by one supplier in connection with a single products or services without 
diminishing the trademark.   This is notably different from copyrights and patents which can 
arguably be used by multiple parties on a concurrent basis without devaluing the intellectual 
property.  Having multiple parties with a right to use a Trademark would muddy the markets 
with multiple parties producing goods bearing the same trademark.  Congress has an interest in 
assuring the public that they receive the products that they intend to buy and therefore should 
address this very important trademark issue.  However, due to the current gridlock in 
Congress,117 it is unlikely that the issue will be addressed any time soon. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current circuit split is untenable.  As it stands, the Fourth and Seventh circuits would 
reach different outcomes when adjudicating the bankruptcies of identical trademark licensors.  
The Fourth Circuit would greatly benefit the licensor by revoking trademark rights from the 
licensee.  The Seventh Circuit would favor the non-bankruptcy licensee by protecting its right to 
continued use of the trademark.  There is a an urgent need for guidance from the Supreme Court 
to resolve the circuit split on the issue so that there is uniformity in the Bankruptcy courts.  The 
balance of the hardships of rejection tips strongly in favor of the debtor and creditors, therefore 
the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari and reversed the Sunbeam decision.   
Although a Supreme Court ruling on the issue is not possible until the issue is appealed to 
the court, Congress should act immediately to clarify the effect of rejection of trademark 
                                                          
117 Susan Davis, This Congress Could Be Least Productive Since 1947, USA Today, August 14, 2012, 
available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-08-14/unproductive-congress-not-passing-
bills/57060096/1 (last visited on December 20, 2012). 
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licensed.  Despite the fact that there is a strong case that Trademarks should be included in the 
definition of Intellectual Property, the unique problem of naked licensing should prevent the 
inclusion on trademarks in Section 101(35A).  Therefore Congress should instruct whether the 
right to use a trademark survives rejection and whether quality control provisions survive 
rejection.  Due to the recent denial of certiorari in the Sunbeam matter, Congressional should act 
immediately to prevent the uneven application of rejection pursuant to Section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
   
